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A Brief Biography of
Judge Richard S. Arnold
John P. Frank and A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.*
Before Richard Arnold was born on March 26, 1936, the
good fairies gathered and agreed to bestow upon him three gifts:
a silver spoon for his mouth, an uncommon brilliance for his
mind, and a profound sense of spirituality for his heart. Thus
encumbered, Richard S. Arnold came into the world where he
soon added three qualities of his own: an extraordinary dili-
gence, a mix of playful humor and modesty, and a sense of per-
sonal grace.
These blessings gave him a start, and an extraordinarily
good one. The crowning blessing, however, came twenty-four
years later, when a clerkship for Justice William Brennan of the
United States Supreme Court began a close and lasting friend-
ship. The clerkship gave him a Weltanschauung, a vision of the
law, the world, and life, which has made him one of America's
great federal judges for the past fifteen years. At the age of fifty-
seven, Judge Arnold, now Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, is enjoying the height of his power. The com-
pletion of fifteen years as a federal judge warrants a moment of
salute.
Arnold was born in Texarkana, on the Texas side of the line
because that was where the hospital was, but the Arnolds made
their home in Arkansas. His father, as well as his grandfather
before him, had practiced law in Texarkana; where an Arnold
firm has existed for well over one hundred years. The family
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firm, with which Arnold himself would later be associated, was
small but enjoyed a lucrative practice in this town of some
25,000, which included the major utilities; hence, the silver
spoon. His grandfather, also named Richard, married Janet
Sheppard, daughter of Texas United States Senator Morris
Sheppard, so that Arnold was born into not only a legal, but a
political family as well. When Senator Sheppard died, Arnold's
grandmother married again, this time to Tom Connally, the
other senator from Texas. Both his paternal and maternal
grandfathers were delegates to the 1924 Democratic Convention
where they cast their early votes for Alabama's Senator Oscar
W. Underwood.
Family life in Texarkana was comfortable and pleasant.
Five years separated Richard from his younger brother, Morris,
universally known as "Buzz," with whom Arnold has formed his
closest personal relationship outside his marriage. Richard's
was a Democratic boyhood, with family members leading the
Democratic Party in the Texarkana area for generations. Buzz,
in contrast, became a Republican and served both as that party's
counsel and state chairman. Except for politics, the brothers
usually agree. A Democrat appointed Richard to the district
court and a Republican later appointed Buzz; they now serve on
the same court. Each regards the other as a best friend.
Although Buzz recalls dropping a brick on Richard's head one
day in the sandbox, both agree that it did no permanent damage.
Childhood in Texarkana provided the usual medley of boys'
activities. Arnold attended private school for two years and pub-
lic school for seven, went to see his hero, Gene Autry, in the
movies from time to time, and played basketball and football.
Arnold also took on golf when he was seven years old and has
enjoyed it ever since. He suffered the typical childhood diseases
and an unusual extra; malaria was all too frequent in Texar-
kana, and it did not leave Arnold unscathed. An intensely book-
ish streak in the man began in the boy; the family library was
substantial and Arnold put it to good use. By the time he was
thirteen or fourteen, he had written a paper, for some now for-
gotten purpose, on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as ap-
plied to the states; he believed at that early age that a citizen's
privileges and immunities included civil liberties.
It was a warm family life. Texarkana was a small enough
town that Arnold's father could come home for lunch. There was
adult talk and fun talk at the table, including spelling games.
Arnold's father possessed, to put it mildly, a strong personality.
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Papa went to Exeter for prep school, Yale for college, and
Harvard for law school. Richard went to Exeter for prep school,
Yale for college, and Harvard for law school. At Exeter and
Yale, Arnold's scholarly impulse could give itself full vent. Latin
and Greek were his main subjects at both institutions and to
this day he can read Latin, but Greek has gotten a little harder.
He has maintained his interest in languages and in his adult life
set out to learn Hebrew. The local rabbi was a good friend and
the rabbi's wife a teacher; Arnold can pick up a Bible in Hebrew
and piece out some of what it says.
Arnold made lifelong friends at Exeter and celebrated his
fortieth reunion there in the summer of 1993. He spent enough
extra time with the books to graduate second in his class at Exe-
ter (his roommate was first), but spent the bulk of his spare time
at the golf course; he was captain of the junior varsity golf team.
On the other hand, success was not unlimited; there were six on
the varsity golf team and Arnold never achieved a ranking
higher than seven. Arnold did graduate first in his class at Yale,
and he worked hard at it. He joined one of the senior societies
but remembers, with particular fondness, his membership in
The Lizzy, the students' name for the Elizabethan Society. A
literary club, The Lizzy had a safe with a first folio of Shake-
speare and what was at least purported to be a lock of Lord By-
ron's hair.
The years spent at Exeter (1949-53) and Yale (1953-57)
were racially turbulent times in the history of the United States,
and particularly in Arkansas. The Arnold family in Texarkana
was sufficiently strong and independent to do as it pleased and
Arnold's mother publicly supported the right of blacks to vote.
The fifties and early sixties were Arnold's formative years in
thinking about racism. Although he initially thought that the
Southern states should deal with segregation themselves, once
the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education,' he
felt it imperative that it be obeyed. During this period, Arkan-
sas's governor, Orval Faubus, forced President Eisenhower to
send troops to desegregate Little Rock's schools. All this turbu-
lence on the home front happened in Arnold's absence, but he
was nonetheless appalled at Faubus's defiance of the law. A
solid Democrat, Arnold voted for Faubus's Republican opponent
in the next election.
During his summers, Arnold worked for a local Texarkana
newspaper, occasionally writing editorials, including a scathing
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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editorial attacking a segregationist judge who sought-and
won-a seat on the Arkansas Supreme Court. By the 1960s, he
was a four-square civil rights supporter and became a member
of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, a major
civil rights group to this day.
The mammoth intellectual challenge in Arnold's young life
came when he entered Harvard Law School in the fall of 1957.
Again he succeeded, graduating first in the class and serving as
case editor of the Harvard Law Review, but the mental stretch-
ing exceeded anything he had known before. The Review set a
standard for him that has guided him ever since: everything
had to be right, not ninety-nine percent right, but right.
In his senior year, Arnold received the offer of a Brennan
clerkship from Professor Paul Freund. The ensuing year with
Brennan formed a turning point in Arnold's life and began a
close friendship that has endured. Although Arnold's points of
view generally coincided with Brennan's, the law clerks' points
of view assumed less importance with a forceful Justice like
Brennan. At the same time, Brennan's freshness of view precip-
itated a shake-up and change of place among the household
gods. For example, Justice Brennan did not agree much with
Henry Hart, the great Frankfurter protege and Harvard's fed-
eral jurisdiction specialist. This came as something of a shock to
Arnold, who, until this point, had supposed that everyone
agreed with Hart. Similarly, Brennan took issue with some
Harvard viewpoints on constitutional law that had found a plat-
form at Yale.
In short, Arnold learned to question what had been the
Harvard point of view during his law school and law review
years. Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter maintained a pleasant
personal relationship with the ex-Harvard law clerk. From
Brennan, Arnold learned that law comprises a great deal more
than running a meat grinder into which one can toss a sack full
of precedent, turn a handle, and serve whatever comes out.
Rather, Arnold worked at the law, writing memoranda for Bren-
nan, discussing cases, and penning early drafts of opinions. Ex-
cept for those documents Brennan has released to the Library of
Congress, however, Arnold declines to discuss them. These ex-
periences, particularly Brennan's influence and tutelage, inten-
sified Arnold's devotion to individual liberty, justice, and all
those things he hopes have accompanied each day of his judicial
life.
Upon leaving the Supreme Court, Arnold spent three years
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with the Washington law firm of Covington & Burling during
which time his close association with Brennan continued. At
Covington, Arnold worked principally on antitrust cases for
Gerhardt Gesell, who later become a federal judge for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. This great corporate law firm encouraged Ar-
nold to take on pro bono work for the American Civil Liberties
Union, which he joined in 1961 immediately after completing his
clerkship. Several cases came to him directly, including a suc-
cessful effort to win a Black Muslim a measure of religious free-
dom while imprisoned.
After three happy years at Covington & Burling, Arnold re-
turned to the family law firm in Texarkana, principally because
he wanted to run for Congress. When he returned to Arkansas,
contact with Justice Brennan necessarily became less frequent.
Nonetheless, they corresponded and Arnold saw the Justice
when in Washington, and annually attended dinners the Justice
held for his small band of clerks and ex-clerks. Arnold spent ten
years in the family firm, mixing his role as corporate defense
counsel with public interest work. When Congress passed the
National Environmental Policy Act, the Environmental Defense
Fund engaged him for some significant cases, one of which con-
tributed to the present requirements for environmental impact
statements.
Arnold spent the years between 1964 and 1966 both practic-
ing law and preparing to run for Congress. Five Democratic
candidates participated in the 1966 primary, including David
Pryor, who subsequently went to the House and presently re-
sides in the United States Senate. Arnold garnered enough sup-
port to force a runoff in the primary, but not enough to prevail.
Although there were substantive issues in the race, they were
secondary in a campaign that was largely one of personalities.
Arnold learned to walk across fields to talk to the farmer on a
tractor and to arrive early at the factory gate to shake hands at
the shift change. Despite these efforts, on election day, Arnold
had a pretty good idea that he would be second best and called
Pryor to find out where he would spend election night. That
evening, on television, he called Pryor to congratulate him and
to pledge his support in the general election; they have been
good friends ever since.
After the 1966 election, Arnold returned to the practice, but
kept a strong hand in politics. He was a Humphrey delegate to
the 1968 Democratic National Convention, a member of the
Arkansas Democratic State Committee, and chairman of its
1993]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rules committee. In short, Arnold became a party regular and
consequentially served in the state constitutional convention of
1968-69, an accomplishment in which he still takes pride. He
ran for Congress again in 1972 against Ray Thornton, who
remains in Congress, but this time there was not even a runoff.
In 1970, Dale Bumpers was elected governor of Arkansas and,
for the next two years, Arnold juggled his law practice with a
stint as the governor's legislative secretary, which meant lobby-
ing for bills the governor favored and keeping him apprised of
the rest. Arnold served as legal counsel to Bumpers's 1974 cam-
paign against William Fulbright and, when Bumpers went to
Washington as a United States senator in 1974, Arnold spent
four years as his legislative director. His support for Bumpers
was personal, political, and professional.
At the level of personal development, the great blessing for
Arnold was to have had Brennan, Gesell, and Bumpers as his
three chiefs. There was nothing stiff about any of them and Ar-
nold's talent for casual camaraderie comes from having had just
that kind of relationship with these three remarkable men. Be-
ing a federal judge can exacerbate a person's preexisting inclina-
tion to be stiff and formidable, but Arnold's three chiefs
vanquished that impulse in him, if it ever existed.
Meanwhile, there was Arnold's personal life. He married
Gale Hussman in 1958, but the two divorced in 1975. Arnold
maintains a very close relationship with their two daughters,
Janet and Lydia. In 1979, he married Kay Kelley and has en-
joyed a superbly happy home life ever since.
In 1978, Senator Bumpers asked President Carter and the
relevant officials at the Justice Department, Griffin Bell and
Mike Egan, to appoint Arnold to a federal district judgeship in
Arkansas. The appointment swept through unopposed. Only a
year and a half later, Bumpers again proposed Arnold for a va-
cancy on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. As a practical
political matter, the Carter Administration and then-Attorney
General Griffin Bell wished to appoint a black district court
judge. Senator Bumpers easily made an arrangement whereby
Arnold moved to the court of appeals and the Administration fil-
led the district court vacancy as desired. Before going to the
circuit, Arnold quit clubs that did not admit women or had a
men's dining room, and one that had no black members; he re-
joined one ten years later after it changed its policy.
Sentencing presented the district court's most difficult task
for Arnold. As a circuit judge, there is, inevitably, a certain re-
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moteness from people. In all likelihood, a circuit judge never
sees the human beings, the real life winners and losers, but a
district judge faces these people all the time, and never more so
than at sentencing, when the one-on-one relationship takes on a
very personal dimension. On the second day of his district court
tenure, Arnold had to sentence four people. Today on the circuit,
he affirms sentences longer than he would mete out, because the
law so requires and he carries out the law. As a sentencing
judge, Arnold was never a moralizer, although he did try to
make minor offenders realize that it was in their own best inter-
ests not to do it again.
The succeeding years have been judging years and writing
years. Enough is now in the books for us to draw a portrait of a
strong and fearless judge. The work product is definitely Ar-
nold's own; he copies no one. The law clerks are helpful, but no
substitute for the judge himself. Until he became chief judge,
Arnold either prepared for arguments himself or the law clerks
studied the cases and then discussed their "book reports" with
the judge. Arnold learns by ear as well as by eye. Until more
recent times, when administrative duties added their demands,
he would dictate his own case memos or jot notes on the back of
briefs.
In the Eighth Circuit practice, the panel decides cases in
conference at the day's end. When cases are assigned to him,
Arnold mentally divides them into three broad categories. If
they are simple, he writes the opinions himself because they can
be completed in a few minutes. If the case presents a difficult
issue, he also writes the opinion himself because he is unsure
what exactly to instruct the law clerk to do. The medium cases,
he divides for first draft purposes among his four clerks. Some
unpublished opinions come from the central staff office in St.
Louis, a practice which Arnold does not like but which, in the
pressure of duty, he is obliged to accept. In making up his mind,
Arnold derives much benefit from oral argument, having found
that many lawyers speak better than they write. In about one-
fifth of the cases, oral argument changes his initial impressions
of the merits.2
What Arnold learned from Brennan is the need to articulate
the reason for his decision. If a clear authority governs, there is
virtually no need for an opinion. Arnold's overarching goal is to
craft a clear, plain and persuasive opinion; he does not employ
2. Richard S. Arnold & Myron H. Bright, Oral Argument, 70 A.B.A. J. 68
(1984).
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literary phrases for their own sake and avoids great length
whenever possible. If Arnold ever becomes a Supreme Court
Justice, he will burn up far fewer pages than any of the present
Justices, or, for that matter, Justice Brennan. Arnold is a
trained classicist and a close student of English literature; the
clerk who uses the wrong word or even the wrong spelling will
be teased about it. Office legend tells that the clerks quickly
refresh their grammatical skills, relearning, for example, the
"unit modifier rule." The judge reminds his clerks that when an
adjective and a noun are put together to modify another noun,
they must be hyphenated. Indeed, he asks his clerks to contem-
plate the difference between "purple people-eater" and "purple-
people eater." The former means a purple eater of people, the
latter an eater of purple people. Nor does the judge casually
accept the clerks' citations. One clerk remembers having been
told to recheck a cite to see whether the Supreme Court had de-
nied certiorari; it had, the previous afternoon.
When the clerks have finished the initial drafts to their sat-
isfaction, they stack the files and the drafts in a fixed place in
the judge's office. The judge reviews them, makes whatever
changes or suggestions he wants, and sends them back to the
clerks for revision. Particularly with new clerks, little things
will be discussed, matters of style or detail which need not be
taught twice. The clerks do not receive the cases cold, nor are
they sent out to find an answer. Rather, the judge tells them
orally why the case is being decided as it is and discusses other
judges' thoughts so the draft can incorporate all points of view.
The procedure is never quite as clean as this may sound; the
case may present several issues and the minor issues, in partic-
ular, often require further discussion. The judge's revisions are
often handwritten; a draft may come back to the clerk with a
note saying "see other side" where the judge will have written
out an abbreviated version of his thoughts.
Arnold is not static; his life reflects a process of intellectual
growth. If we may borrow from the classics, which he has stud-
ied so closely, Arnold did not spring full blown from the head of
Zeus; his has been a growing mind whose evolutionary stages
have left their individual marks. For a minute illustration, Ar-
nold's student law review note3 addresses federal court absten-
tion: when and how a federal court should either leave a matter
in the state court or send it there for an initial decision. A com-
3. Richard S. Arnold, Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73
HAnv. L. REv. 1358 (1960).
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prehensive comment, reflecting the Harvard Law Review at its
best, it thoroughly lays out the relevant law; its sole flaw is that
it presents a wholly impractical solution. As with much earnest
student writing, the piece ends with a recommendation, unfortu-
nately, of the worst possible solution: state questions should be
litigated entirely in the state courts and the federal questions
entirely in the federal courts, maintaining that perfect symme-
try of the federal system at the expense of the litigants who
must bear the increased costs of dual litigation and wait end-
lessly for an answer to their question.
Arnold, however, was not passive before the basic prepos-
terousness of this dual system. Illustrating a forward vision, he
embraced an alternative solution, certification, which at that
time existed only in Florida. This procedure sends a puzzling
state law question directly to the state's supreme court for reso-
lution. Thus, in 1960, Arnold foresaw the wave of the future;
today, certification is a standard device.
Arnold's student note reflects standard Harvard doctrine as
developed by Justice Frankfurter, the Harvard demigod of Ar-
nold's student days. By 1964, Arnold, now writing frequently,
was following his own intellectual star. Discussing the power of
state courts to enjoin federal courts, he considered the problems
arising when the same parties file identical cases in state and
a federal court.4 Arnold acknowledged that the state court can-
not enjoin the federal courts, but went further to urge what is
now standard practice: whichever court gets the case second,
whether state or federal, ought to voluntarily stay the proceed-
ing until the first court renders its decision. Arnold noted that
"[i]nter-court conflict, though it may be particularly undesirable
in the federal and state context, is always undesirable to some
degree. If there is some other adequate remedy, it should be
used."5
What is of interest in the article is Arnold's emancipation
from Frankfurter's intellectual grasp. Although Arnold did cite
a Frankfurter dissent, which he clearly respected, it was equally
clear that he declined to follow it. By 1967, he had overtly added
Justice Black to his pantheon of intellectual heroes, and to this
day, insofar as he has any model for his opinions, he deliberately
follows Black's style of concise clarity.6
4. Richard S. Arnold, State Power to Enjoin Federal Court Proceedings, 51
VA. L. REv. 59 (1965).
5. Id. at 73.
6. Richard S. Arnold, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws, 1953-
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The Black model presents a more profound parallel in terms
of intellectual growth. These are two Southern judges; Birming-
ham and Little Rock sit on virtually the same latitude. As a
young man, before he ran for the Senate, Black was a member of
the Ku Klux Klan. In his mature years, Black grew, becoming
one of the foremost civil libertarians and racial egalitarians in
the nation's history. Arnold was never such an extremist, but
when Brown v. Board of Education7 came down, Arnold, then a
college student, was not sympathetic to it. In his later years, he
too, by virtue of his intellectual growth and deep conviction, has
become one of the firmest supporters of civil liberties generally
and equal rights specifically of any judge on the bench. A little
Brennan, a little Black, and a little growing up have gone a long
way.
A great contemporary civil rights issue of Arnold's judicial
years has been the drive to achieve equality for women.8 The
most colorful of the early women's rights cases came before
Judge Arnold at the district court. The case presented a suit by
a fourteen-year-old ninth grade girl who wanted to play basket-
ball under boys' rules.9 At that time, Arkansas was one of the
few remaining states that "protected" girls by permanently sta-
tioning them in only half the court. Arnold, a district judge, con-
fronted the fact that both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and
an Oklahoma district court had held this basketball classifica-
tion to pass constitutional muster.' 0 Never one to be intimi-
dated by authority-Arnold had previously declined to follow an
opinion of his own circuit that he felt had been eroded by
time"l-Arnold ruled, "Arkansas girls simply do not get the full
benefit and experience of the game of basketball available to Ar-
kansas boys."' 2 As a result, he stated, "[t]hose whose ambition
it is to play basketball in college, perhaps even on scholarship,
are at a marked disadvantage." 13 Arnold laid out his funda-
mental thesis on equal rights for women: "Simply doing things
1967, 34 A.B.A. ANTrrRUST L.J. 2 (1967) (a report of an address delivered to the
Section of the Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. In this survey, I overlap a little with the companion essay by Judge
Patricia M. Wald, who takes up these matters comprehensively.
9. Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 394, 395 (E.D. Ark.
1979).
10. Id. at 398.
11. Pinson v. Morris, 830 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
829 (1988).
12. 468 F. Supp. at 396.
13. Id.
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the way they've always been done is not an 'important govern-
ment objective,' if indeed it is a legitimate objective at all....
[T]radition alone, without supporting gender-related substan-
tive reasons, cannot justify placing girls at a disadvantage for no
reason other than their being girls." 14
In the women's rights field, Arnold has authored one opin-
ion that has raised criticism, United States Jaycees v.
McClure.15 At issue was whether the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce had to admit women members. Arnold's opinion held that
they did not, although he made clear that he thought the Cham-
ber's judgment unsound. 16 Nonetheless, because much of the
Jaycees's activity focused on political expression and legislative
advocacy, Arnold held that they enjoyed a right to free associa-
tion, however distasteful.17 He added, "We have no doubt that if
the Jaycees operated a swimming pool, a bar or a restaurant, the
facility would have to be open to women as well as men."18 He
found the practice offensive, but not illegal, although he believed
the states could instruct their employees "not to join such a
club."19 Judge Donald P. Lay dissented, and the Supreme Court
found that he had the better argument, and reversed Judge Ar-
nold's decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.20
Women's issues arose in many contexts. In one instance, a
woman filed both a federal and state action alleging that she
had been wrongfully discharged for refusing to have sexual rela-
tions with her foreman. 21 The federal claim was time-barred,
and there was no clear Arkansas law on the point. Arnold led
the way in formulating some. Arnold noted that Arkansas had
criminalized prostitution, and that "[a] woman invited to
trade herself for a job is in effect being asked to become a prosti-
tute."22 Thus, he held that the complaint stated a common law
claim for wrongful discharge, 23 a position the Arkansas
Supreme Court later adopted.24
14. Id. at 398.
15. 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Judge Wald accounts for this decision by noting
that "even at his peak, Jack Nicholas had an off-day."
16. 709 F.2d at 1570-73.
17. Id. at 1561.
18. Id. at 1571.
19. Id. at 1573.
20. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
21. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 1205.
23. Id. at 1203.
24. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Ark. 1988).
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In yet another case, Arnold held that the University of Min-
nesota had discriminated in determining whether a woman
should become a department head.25 Arnold noted, "A selection
process [for department chairs] that is subjective and dominated
by men requires particularly close scrutiny."26
In the famous Webster case,27 Judge Arnold was again far
ahead of the Supreme Court. He wrote specially to express his
view that the provisions of the statute forbidding the use of pub-
lic facilities, employees, or funds to encourage or counsel certain
abortions was unconstitutional. This limitation on speech he
found "flatly inconsistent with the First Amendment, as incor-
porated against the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 28 The Supreme Court rejected this
view in Rust v. Sullivan,29 although the restrictions Arnold com-
plained of have since been removed by President Clinton.30
Arnold's dissent in Henne v. Wright,31 illustrates his strong
support of family rights. In Henne, an Eighth Circuit majority
upheld a Nebraska statute that required babies to be given
names with which they had a legally established parental con-
nection. Judge Arnold dissented, arguing that parents had a
fundamental right to name their own children and that the state
had no legitimate interest in the exercise of that right.32
The Eighth Circuit has a significant black population, and
Arnold has coped with the resultant discrimination from every
standpoint. Addressing racial discrimination in sentencing, Ar-
nold was again ahead of the Supreme Court-which, indeed, has
yet to catch up with him. In Rogers v. Britton,3 3 a young black
man, who had been convicted of rape and received a heavy sen-
tence, contended that a constitutional disparity existed between
the sentencing of black and white rapists. Arnold accepted the
hypothesis that if such a disparity existed, it would raise a con-
stitutional question. He then conducted a careful case-by-case
analysis of the recorded sentences and found that the asserted
disparity simply did not exist.34
25. Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 474.
27. Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988).
28. Id. at 1085.
29. 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
30. Memorandum, 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993).
31. 904 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032 (1991).
32. Id. at 1218-19.
33. 466 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980).
34. Id. at 403.
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Arnold, however, went one step further. The state court
had sentenced the defendant, sixteen years old at the time of the
offense, to life without possibility of parole.3 5 Arnold first gave
the Arkansas Supreme Court an opportunity to review the mat-
ter and then adjusted the sentence.3 6 Recognizing that retribu-
tion is a legitimate factor in sentencing and that "rape is
probably more revolting, more heinous, than any crime except
murder," Arnold nonetheless concluded that "all rapes are not
the same, and all victims of rape are not equally affected."3 7
The sentence was invalid, Arnold held, because the jury was
given absolutely no guidance in fixing it.38 The trial court failed
even to instruct the jury that it could not consider the race of the
victim or the defendant in determining the appropriate
sentence.
A common racial problem Arnold has frequently encoun-
tered is employment discrimination. In a discriminatory dis-
charge case, Judge Arnold's opinion reversed the trial court for
excluding evidence that the employer had "excluded blacks from
its workforce," and "offered free rides to white customers while
black customers were told to rent cars," and that members of
"management referred to blacks as 'niggers.' "9 He found that
discriminatory practices on the job, if proved, would have some
legitimate bearing on whether the employer had a racially hos-
tile motive for the discharge. 40 Another Arnold opinion prefaced
the now prevailing view that the government's use of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude black jurors based solely on their race
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id. at 403.
37. Id. at 402. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
in noncapital cases due process does not require sentencing standards. Arnold
has not done rapists any favors, however. In a federal habeas corpus action,
reviewing an Iowa state conviction, the petitioner had forced his way into a
woman's car, drove to a secluded space, and forced sexual relations, including
sodomy, on her, before releasing the victim. Knutson v. Brewer, 619 F.2d 747(8th Cir. 1980). The Iowa court held that this constituted "kidnapping for ran-
som;" Iowa defined ransom as exacting "money, property, or a thing of value."
Id. at 751. The question before Arnold was whether the state court's holding
this stretched this definition of "ransom" beyond all reason. Arnold's opinion
upheld the conviction reasoning that if sodomy were not a "thing of value" to
the rapist, he would not have demanded it. Id. at 752. In another case, the
defendant raped and sodomized his mother for which the state court sentenced
him to two consecutive life sentences; this case was also upheld. Pinson v. Mor-
ris, 830 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1987).
38. In the Arkansas state courts, if a defendant pleads not guilty and is
convicted, the jury fixes the sentence.
39. Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1102 (8th Cir. 1988).
40. Id. at 1103.
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violates the Equal Protection Clause.41
One of the most racially charged issues Arnold ever faced
was the desegregation of the Little Rock school system.42 The
unusual opinion speaks through Judge Heaney, who begins the
opinion by noting that Judge Arnold scripted certain portions of
the opinion and collaborated in others. The Eighth Circuit, deci-
sively requiring desegregation, found the school board in con-
tempt for failing to comply with an earlier order relating to
magnet schools.43 The portion written by Judge Arnold man-
dated a new system for choosing the school board in order to
eliminate the potency for willful segregation.44
As previously noted, Arnold was tutored on the First
Amendment as a boy at home, and it remains the heart of the
Constitution for him. Although Justice Brennan may have in-
tensified this view, Arnold required no steering toward his fer-
vent belief in the "Firstness" of the First Amendment. When
the University of Arkansas Gay and Lesbian Students Associa-
tion brought a civil rights suit against the student senate which
had denied its request for funds normally available to student
organizations because of the GLSA's message, Judge Arnold's
opinion held that the denial violated the First Amendment:
In brief, we hold that a public body that chooses to fund speech or
expression must do so even-handedly, without discrimination among
recipients on the basis of their ideology. The University need not sup-
ply funds to student organizations; but once having decided to do so, it
is bound by the First Amendment to act without regard to the content
of the ideas being expressed. This will mean, to use Holmes's phrase,
that the taxpayers will occasionally be obligated to support not only
the thought of which they approve, but also the thought that they hate.
That is one of the fundamental premises of American law.
4 5
National Vendors v. NLRB 46 also illustrates Arnold's sensi-
tivity toward free speech. The case presented the question
whether an employer could refuse its employees permission to
conduct meetings in the employees' cafeteria during non-work
41. Reynolds v. City of Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990).
42. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. Number 1,
839 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 869 (1988). Judge Wald dis-
cusses in some detail what she describes as "a truly extraordinary voting rights
opinion," which required the redistricting of the Arkansas legislature, Jeffers v.
Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), affd, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991).
43. 839 F.2d at 1298.
44. Id. at 1299-1301.
45. Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir.
1988).
46. 630 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1980).
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hours to discuss the progress of contract negotiations.47 In dis-
sent, Judge Arnold argued that, absent any evidence of potential
disturbances, the employees were within their rights to commu-
nicate with each other.48 Arnold has also recognized that public
employees, by virtue of their employment, do not surrender their
free speech rights.49
Arnold has also vigilantly protected freedom of the press,
even in the face of the media's extreme criticism of public offi-
cials. Arnold subscribes to the Jeffersonian view that press at-
tacks are "an evil for which there is no remedy. Our liberty
depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited
without being lost."50
This brief outline of Arnold's work in colorful contemporary
areas reflects only a fragment of Arnold's jurisprudence. Arnold
has also carefully attended to the usual mass of other, more
mundane, matters. Some of these cases illustrate subtle atten-
tion to detail, particularly where they involve individual claims.
In one such case, an employer that had nine employees in one
division laid off the oldest two. 5' The two claimed age discrimi-
nation, noting that all the remaining employees were at least
fifteen years younger. 52 Arnold approached the problem by ob-
serving, "This fact is certainly not conclusive evidence of age dis-
crimination in itself, but it is surely the kind of fact which would
cause a reasonable trier of fact to raise an eyebrow, and proceed
to assess the employer's explanation for this outcome." 53
In a disability case in which the plaintiff appeared pro se,
Arnold, noting the absence of counsel, effectively appointed him-
self counsel for the claimant.54 Reluctantly, Arnold decided the
case against himself for lack of a cognizable claim.55
Arnold never sweeps the claims of single individuals under
the rug. In warm praise of Justice Blackmun, Arnold has noted
that Blackmun "has not disdained to concern himself with the
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1269.
49. McGee v. South Pemniscot Sch. Dist. R-V, 712 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1983).
50. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 759 F.2d 644, 657, affd, 788 F.2d 1300 (8th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
51. MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1988).
52. Id. at 1058.
53. Id.
54. Marchant v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 923,925 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("Plaintiff
is not represented by counsel on this appeal, so the Court is without the benefit
of legal argument on her behalf. It might be argued, however, that..
55. Id. at 925-26.
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least of his brothers and sisters."56 In another Social Security
disability case, Arnold closely scrutinized the facts and decided
for the applicant, holding, "Neither the Administrative Law
Judge nor this Court, however, is free to single out as the basis
for the decision only the evidence favorable to the Secretary, and
the Court is convinced that this is what the finder of fact did in
this case." 57 If Arnold has an overarching guideline, it is a spirit
of fairness. For example, in a criminal case, the Government
had permitted a key witness to testify falsely on a critical
point.58 Arnold held that: "The duty to correct false testimony
is on the prosecutor, and that duty arises when the false evi-
dence appears."59
Although Arnold repeatedly gives kind attention to cases in-
volving individuals, he usually maintains a hard line when the
appellant has not brought the claimed errors to the trial judge's
attention. If counsel fails to object to an instruction at trial, he
will receive a very chilly reception from Judge Arnold when he
reaches the court of appeals. 60 One reason for this strict rule is
that district courts, as a matter of courtesy, should have the first
opportunity to consider the case. Arnold is never heavy-handed
with the lower courts, doubtless one reason for his popularity.
In still another Social Security case, the district court set forth
nine separate reasons for denying the claim.6 ' The court of ap-
peals, Judge Arnold writing, reversed but, albeit briskly, ad-
dressed each of the nine grounds.62 The case illustrates that
when Judge Arnold reverses a district court, he makes clear
why.
The typical Arnold opinion is short and never windy, but
complicated cases may require long opinions. A combination
RICO and drug case once generated a twenty-five page opinion,
one of Arnold's longest; thirty-seven headnotes indicate the mat-
ter's complexity.63 The case involved large-scale importation of
drugs by air from Mexico, Canada, and Columbia; approxi-
mately one hundred overt acts were involved.64 Arnold's
56. Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Blackmun, 8 HAMiLIu L. REV. 20, 22
(1985).
57. Money v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 636, 641 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
58. United States v. Bigeleisen, 625 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 298.
60. See, e.g., Phenix Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 856
F.2d 1125 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989).
61. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1987).
62. Id. at 882-84.
63. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 843-47 (8th Cir. 1987).
64. Id. at 848.
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breadth was clearly warranted. In another complex regulatory
matter, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had im-
posed certain additional costs on a power company, which in
turn petitioned the Missouri Public Service Commission to im-
mediately increase its rates to offset the new costs. 65 Recogniz-
ing that new federal costs will have to be passed on, Judge
Arnold held that the states are nonetheless entitled to proceed
in ratemaking "with as little intrusion" as possible and that
such costs need not be "passed on intact."66 The state is entitled
to decide whether savings in other areas might make a lesser
adjustment suitable.67 A gem of an opinion, it resolves all the
difficult jurisdictional problems inherent in the relationship be-
tween the federal courts and state utility commissions and rigor-
ously addresses the merits as well.
In another very significant criminal case, Arnold's opinion
deals with the use of hypnosis on witnesses who thereby make
criminal identifications. In a well-organized opinion on a com-
plex subject, the court, through Judge Arnold, reviews the ways
in which hypnotism can potentially corrupt testimony, includ-
ing: "confabulation, the process by which the subject fills in
gaps in her memory to make her recall more coherent;" "sug-
gestibility," which arises when the "subject wishes to please the
hypnotist;" and "memory-hardening." 68 These hazards did not
lead Arnold to reject hypnotism outright as a useful device, but
he did conclude that when the state introduces evidence pro-
cured through hypnotism, the resultant complexity requires
that the defendant have its own expert to aid cross-
examination.69
Finally, in a Robinson-Patman action brought by an aircraft
dealer against a manufacturer, Arnold found that Cessna main-
tained a discriminatory pricing system that unfairly differenti-
ated between its various distributors.70 Arnold also found,
however, that this discrimination worked no injury on the plain-
tiff who operated within a defined sales area that apparently
lost no sales as a result thereof.71 The opinion displays a
65. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 829 F.2d
1444 (8th Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 1451.
67. Id.
68. Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 1245.
70. White Indus. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 845 F.2d 1497 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
71. Id. at 1501-02.
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thoughtful rather than an automatic application of the antitrust
laws: Mere sin is insufficient; there must be consequence from
sin. The opinion demonstrates the cool quality of analysis that
permeates Arnold's work.
Let us retreat from this potpourri of opinions, more inevita-
ble than enchanting in a piece of this kind, to look at our subject
in its entirety. In Judge Arnold's opinions, we have witnessed
uniformly good work, crafted at the highest professional level.
Clearly, if there were a judicial Miss America contest, Judge Ar-
nold would win the congeniality award. His office, with its
parade of clerks and staff, is a genuinely happy family and Ar-
nold enjoys both the respect and the affection of the lawyers who
practice before him, as well as the judges with whom he sits and
whom he leads. In this respect, he acknowledges Justice Bren-
nan as a model. He counsels that judges will always have differ-
ences but they must never be spiteful: "Membership on a multi-
judge court is something like a marriage. It is more than a con-
tract, it is a status. As long as you are in it, you cannot have
your own way all of the time." 72
A standard reference work for lawyers tells them what to
expect from a particular judge.73 The comments about Arnold
reflect favorably on him: "probably the highest I.Q. on the court,
and a very nice man," "an active questioner, so counsel had bet-
ter be prepared," "brilliant," "smooth," "very knowledgeable, es-
pecially on economic regulation," "brightest judge on the bench,"
"super," "a polite gentleman, a fine scholar, a good judge." 74
Current styles seem to demand that federal judges be classi-
fied as "liberal" or "conservative," but Arnold, unresponsive to
that demand, defies characterization. The Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette threw in the towel, finally describing him as "the liber-
als' favorite conservative and the conservatives' favorite lib-
eral." 75 We would go farther than this. On economic matters,
Arnold does not take the bench to beat business over the head.
On constitutional matters, he always aspires to rigorous enforce-
ment of the Constitution, every last bit of it, and the Bill of
Rights in particular. He has managed, even though a busy man
72. Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan--an Appreciation, 26 HAnv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 10 (1991).
73. 2 PRENTICE HALL LAw & BUsINEss, ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JuDici-
ARY, EIGHTH Cmcurr: LAwYs' CommENTs ABouT =i EIGHTH Cmcurr (1993).
74. Id.
75. Editorial, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETIE, Mar. 28, 1993, at J5.
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in a high place, to maintain a peculiar sensitivity to the needs of
individuals, the people, so that individual claims of whatever
sort receive an exquisite detail of attention. On the federal
bench, with its complex records, multiplicity of facts to be con-
sidered, and stringent time constraints, it is easy to slip into for-
mulary justice, to sweep the individual claim into the waste bin
with some incantation about discretion or standard of review.
Arnold operates within the classical rules, but nonetheless en-
sures that people get their day in his court. In this respect, in
his devotion to the First Amendment, and in his brevity and di-
rectness, he is truly Justice Black revived, and it is singularly
appropriate that both Black's and Brennan's portraits hang in
his chambers.
The key to Arnold's jurisprudence is conscience. We men-
tioned at the outset the three gifts of the fairies, one of which
was spirituality. Judge Arnold's conscience, informed by this
deep and innate spirituality provides his guiding star: as he
sees it, "If you have made a serious effort to focus your own con-
science on any subject and have reflected on it carefully, and you
are doing what your conscience tells you ought to be doing, then
that is what God requires." 76
76. Interview with Richard S. Arnold, Chief Judge, Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Little Rock, Ark. (Apr. 6, 1993).
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